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REDUCTION TO PRACTICE OF PATENTABLE
INVENTIONS.
Who is the first and original inventor of a patentable in-
vention? When does a patentable invention first exist? An at-
tempt to answer these questions .reveals at once a large popular
misapprehension on a problem no one may solve to meet all ex-
isting and possible conditions. It would, indeed, be the height of
presumption on my part to attempt any finality of statement upon
either of these questions which have engaged the minds 9f such
great jurists as Mr. Justice Story in Reed v. Cuater,1 Judge Taft
in Christie v. Seybold,2 Judge Putnam in Automatic Weighing
Machine Company v. Pneumatic Scale Corporation," and Judges
Colt, Lowell and Aldrich upon the appeal of that case.4 It is, in
fact, something of a shock to the smugness of our learning that
sixty-two years after the pronouncement of Mr. Justice Story in
Reed v. Cutter, it should be necessary for Judge Colt to write a
very substantial monograph upon the entire subject. But a shock of
this sort is beneficial in that it awakes us to a better mentality and
ir Story, 59o; Fed. Cas. 11,645 (1841).
'55 Fed. Rep. 69; 5 C C. A. 33 (1893).
158 Fed. Rep. 415 (i9o8).
' 166 Fed. Rep. 288; 92 C. C. A. 2o6 (19og).
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dissipates in some measure false conceptions due to loose think-
ing.
The lay idea is that the man who first performs the mental
act of inventing or discovering a thing is the original and first
inventor, and is entitled to a patent under all.circumstances. And
it is a question whether this idea has not lodgment in the minds of
a majority of lawyers in general practice; and I venture the ques-
tion whether there may not be some patent attorneys who are
yet to have this false conception removed. Again, it is a much
more prevalent idea that, when one has conceived an invention
and has made a model, drawing, or description of it sufficient for
one to take such disclosure and embody the mental act in concrete
form, he may then rest calmly at least the full two years which
he supposes the statute gives him5 before filing his patent applica-
tion. Many of us have clients--inventors, engineers, manufac-
turers-who make it their practice to complete drawings and de-
scriptions of inventions as they arise, date and witness such dis-
closures, and file them away to be made the subject-matter of
construction and patent application at any future time,-abiding
in the false conception that such an act establishes prior right
under all circumstances.
Before entering upon a discussion of these problens, we
should refresh our minds upon the constitutional and statutory
fundamentals and upon the broad principles laid upon them by
the courts. The Constitution provides that
"The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the
progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."*
In pursuance of this vested power the Congress has enacted,
among other things, the following:
"Any person who has invented or discovered any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvements thereof, not known or used
by others in this country, before his invention or discovery
thereof, and not patented or described in any printed publica-
I R. S., §4886, quoted infra.
'Art. I, §&
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tion in this or any foreign country, before his invention or dis-
covery thereof, or more than two years prior to his application,
and not in public use or on sale in this country for more than
two years prior to his application, unless the same is proved to
have been abandoned, may, upon payment of the fees required
by law, and other due proceeding had, obtain a patent there-
for.,t
"Before any inventor or discoverer shall receive a patent
for his invention or discovery, he shall make application there-
for, in writing, to the Commissioner of Patents and shall file
in the Patent Office a written description of the same, and of
the manner and process of making, constructing, compounding,
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it apper-
tains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, con-
struct, compound, and use the same; and in case of a machine,
he shall explain the principle thereof, and the best mode in
which he has contemplated applying that principle, so as to dis-
tinguish it from other inventions; and he shall particularly
point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combi-
nation which he claims as his invention or discovery. The
specification and claim shall be signed by the inventor and at-
tested by two witnesses."'
It thus becomes clear that a patentable invention, which the
Constitution calls a "discovery", is a mental act, an abstract
thing, as well as a concrete act. It must not only be new in the
sense of being a discovery--a mental act,-but it must be useful
-a concrete thing. It must at least have reached the concrete-
ness of description, specification and claim required by Section
4888 above quoted. The necessity of this two-fold act was early
recognized by the courts. In LeRoy v. Tatham9 Mr. Justice
McLean said:
"However brilliant the discovery of the new principle may
be, to make it useful it must be applied to some practical pur-
pose. Short of this no patent can be granted."
There can be no question but that the courts have thus uniformly
held; but the open question has been, and still is, precisely what,
- exactly what, in all cases, constitutes the second half of the statu-
tory requirement.
'R. C, §4886; U. S. Comp. Stat. 3382.
OR. S., §4888; U. S. Comp. Stat. &383.
'22 How. 132; 14 L. Ed. 367 0859).
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Still another provision of the patent statute is:
"In any action for infringement the defendant may plead
the general issue, and, having given notice in writing to the
plaintiff or his attorney thirty days before, may prove on trial
any one or more of the following special matters:
"Second. That he had surreptitiously or unjustly obtained
the patent for that which was in fact invented by another, who
was using reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting the
same.
. .. And the like defenses may be pleaded in any suit
in equity for relief against an alleged infringement; and proofs
of the same may be given upon like notice in the answer of the
defendant, and with the like effect. '"1
And it is here to be noted and not overlooked that, while the
basic provision, Section 4886, names the two prerequisites, "new"
(discovery) "and useful" (reduction to practice), and Section
4888 requires substantial reduction to practice, and Section
4893,11 defining the duties of the Commissioner of Patents,
makes essential to the granting of a patent
.. . . that the claimant is justly entitled to a patent under
the law, and that the same is sufficiently useful and impor-
tant ..
as a plain matter of fact the Patent Office never has, and in the
nature of things never can, actually pass upon the utility (actual
reduction to practice) of any invention.
It is notorious that a very large number of patented inven-
tions go from the mind of the inventor to the drafting-board and,
practically, from the drafting-board direct to the Patent Office.
And it is also notorious that no small portion of inventions as
actually patented are not only never reduced to practice, but are
absolutely incapable of such reduction in -the sense of possessing
actual, working qualities which would comply with "sufficiently
useful and important", under the injunction of the statute above
"'R. S., §4920; U. S. Comp. Stat. 3394.
" U. S. Comp. Stat. 3384.
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quoted. Out of this unavoidable condition has grown the rule
that the filing of a patent application capable of allowance is con-
structive reduction to practice,-a rule which seems to have had
the sanction of the Supreme Court as early as Bates v. Coe,
12
which was decided in i868, and which was followed in the Tele-
phone Cases,13 in which it was said:
"Although at the time Bell applied for his patent he had
never actually transmitted spoken works so that they could be
distinctly understood, so long as he had described the device
with sufficient precision to enable one skilled in the art there-
after to produce a speaking telephone, it was sufficient."
We may now safely conclude (i) that before an invention
becomes a patentable invention it must possess, in addition to the
mental act of invention or discovery, a concrete embodiment of
the new and useful idea; (2) that the filing of a patent applica-
tion disclosing the inventive act and the method of practising the
same is constructive embodiment and reduction to practice.
Before taking up the Weighing Machine Case,14 we should
have before us the rulings in the two leading cases of earlier
dates. Mr. Justice Story, in writing the opinion in Reed v.
Cutter,"5 as long ago as 1841, said:
"These latter words {"was using reasonable diligence in
adapting and perfecting his invention", above quoted from Sec-
tion 4920] were copied from the fifteenth section of the Act of
!836, Chapter 357, and constitute a qualification of the preced-
ing language of that section; so that an inventor who has first
actually perfected his invention will not be deemed to have
surreptitiously or unjustly obtained a patent for that which
was first invented by another, unless the latter was at that
time using reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting the
same. And this I take to be clearly the law; for he is the first
inventor in the sense of the act, and entitled to a patent for his
invention, who has first adapted and perfected the same to use;
and until the invention is so perfected and adapted for use, it
is not patentable. An imperfect and incomplete invention, ex-
"98 U. S. 31; 25 L Ed. 68.
3' 126 U. S. 1; 31 L Ed. 863; 8 S. C. Rep. 778 (2888).
"Automatic Weighing Machine Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., x66 Fed.
Rep. 288, 92 C. C. A. 206 (igog).
" Supra, I. 1.
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isting in mere theory or in intellectual notion, or in uncertain
experiments, and not actually reduced to practice, and embodied
in some distinct machinery, apparatus, manufacture, or coipo-
sition of matter, is not, and indeed cannot be, patentable under
our patent acts, since it is utterly impossible, under such cir-
cumstances, to comply with the fundamental requisites of those
acts. In a race of diligence between two independent invent-
ors, he who first reduces his invention to a fixed, positive, and
practical form would seem to be entitled to a priority of right
to a patent therefor. . .. The clause now under considera-
tion seems to qualify that right by providing that in such case
he who invents first shall have the prior right, if he is using
reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting the same, al-
though the second inventor has, in fact, first perfected the same,
and reduced the same to practice in a positive form. It thus
gives full effect to the well-known maxim that he has the better
right who is prior in point of time, namely, in making the dis-
covery or invention."
Recognizing this as a leading case repeatedly quoted and
approved, Judge Taft wrote the opinion in Christie v. Seybold,16
in which the fact-conditions were as follows: Seybold conceived
his invention in October, 1885, made a rough sketch and showed
it to others in January, 1886, made working drawings in October,
i888, and built his first machine in April, 1889. Christie con-
ceived the same invention in the summer of 1886, had working
drawings and patterns made in the early summer of i888, and
completed his first machine July 12, i888. The two applications
were filed within a day of each other. It will thus be seen that,
while Seybold was the first to discover the invention by a year,
he delayed actual building over three years, within which period
Christie had both conceived the invention and reduced it to prac-
tice by actual construction. Seybold was unable to excuse his
long delay on any grounds which appealed to the court. In hold-
ing that Seybold, though earlier in conception, in making sketches
and in explaining his invention to others, was not the first and
original inventor under the patent law, Judge Taft said:
"It is obvious from the foregoing [the above quotation
from Reed v. Cutter] that the man who first reduces an inven-
tion to practice is prima facie the first and true inventor, but
" Supra, n. .
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that the man who first conceives, and, in a mental sense, first
invents, a machine, art, or composition of matter, may date
his patentable invention back to the time of its conception, if
he connects the conception with its reduction to practice by
reasonable diligence on his part, so that they are substantially
one continuous act. The burden is on the second reducer to
practice to show the prior conception, and to establish the con-
nection between that conception and his reduction to practice
by proof of due diligence.....
"As Christie reduced the invention to practice nearly a
year before Seybold's press was made, the burden is on Sey-
bold to show that from the time of his original conception,
which antedated that of Christie, he was using reasonable dili-
gence in adapting and perfecting his idea to practical use.
Has he sustained that burden? It is quite clear to us that he
has not. . . . I
"It can hardly be claimed that the rough sketch made by
Seybold of his proposed press in January, 1886, was a reduc-
tion to practice. It has been held in many cases that drawings,
much more complete than the one here testified to, are not re-
ductions to practice, as against a subsequent conceiver who first
made an actual, operative machine."
Hence we may state the rule as it stood prior to the final de-
cision in the Weighing Machine Case thus: As between two bona
fide and independent inventors claiming the same invention, he
who first completes the two-fold act of invention--conception
and reduction to practice by actual construction or operation-is
in the law of patents, the first and original inventor -when the
other inventor, though prior in conception, has failed to exercise
due diligence in reducing his invention to practice by actual con-
struction or operation. And to this may be added the corollary:
Making and exhibiting to others sketches or descriptions of the
invention is neither actual nor constructive reduction to practice.
We may now turn to the Weighing Machine Case to see in
what respect it has changed the rule thus well established. The
complainant held 'a patent issued to Thomas. The defendant
held a patent issued to Watson. The patents covered the same
invention. The defense was under Section 4920, priority of in-
vention by Watson. Bona fide and independent invention was
conceded. The following tabulation of facts will enable us to
see the problem presented:
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ACTS PERFORMED. WATsoN. THOMAS.
Conception of in- January xo, 1896, No proof (con-
vention. (proved by draw- structively date
ings and disclos- of application).
ure to others).
Reduction to prac- April, 1897, (by ac- December 17, x896,
tice. tual construction (constructively by
of working ma- filing patent ap-
chine). plication).
Application filed. March xI, 1898. December 7, 1896.
Date of Issue of September 26, 1899. July 26, i9o4.
Patent
From this tabulation it will be seen that Watson conceived his in-
vention and disclosed it to others by drawings and explanation
eleven months before Thomas filed his application, and that
Thomas offered no evidence to prove invention either as concep-
tion or reduction to practice earlier than his filing date, December
17, 1896.
If we had tabulated Christie v. Seybold as we have the
Weighing Machine Case, we should find, by comparing Christie
and Thomas, the two prevailing contestants, that (i) Christie
conceived his invention and disclosed it to others long prior to his
reduction to practice and filing his patent application, .while
Thomas made no disclosure prior to filing his application and
made the date of his application constructively the date of his
conception (which, of course, could not have been the case);
(2) Christie's prior reduction to practice was by actual construc-
tion of a working machine, while Thomas' reduction to practice
was solely by filing a patent application; (3) Thomas, so far as
the record shows, never made any reduction to practice by con-
struction at any time, so that his only disclosure was by drawings
and description in his patent application, differing from the long-
prior disclosure of his opponent by drawings and disclosure to
others only in degree and detail, and not in kind.
In the interference proceedings in the Patent Office the hold-
ings were: Examiner of Interferences in favor of Thomas; Ex-
aminers-in-Chief in favor of Watson; the Commissioner of Pat-
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ents in favor of Thomas; the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia in favor of Thomas. In the equity action the holdings
were: The Circuit Court in favor of Watson; the Circuit Court
of Appeals in favor of Thomas. And it is to be remarked, first,
that the Examiners-in-Chief is an appellate court of three judges
of the highest judicial and technical ability; and, second, that
Judge Putnam is one of the master-minds in patent questions.
One may not, then, brush aside the reasoning of this powerful
minority without grave reflection.
While the above tabulation shows a complication sufficient
to satisfy any puzzle-lover, it suggests possible complications
without number. For example, merely to suggest one that might
exist, suppose that, prior to Thomas' filing date, Watson hafd
made reduction to practice by a model which, though a model and
not a full-sized machine, was an actual working device. What
then would have been the rule? In his opinion Judge Colt says:
"In patented inventions there are several distinct stages
of the invention. Some patented inventions comprise only
three stages, namely, conception (evidenced by drawings, dis-
closures, or models), application, patent; while other patented
inventions comprise four stages, namely, conception, reduction
to practice, application, patent."
Here it will be seen that Judge Colt classifies "models" as a
part of the first stage of invention-conception. If the model
were a working device, as it might well be, could we then say that
it was merely evidence of conception, and not evidence of reduc-
tion to practice?
Hence we have the rule as laid down by Judge Colt: As be-
tween two botn fide and independent inventors claiming the same
invention, he who first completes the two-fold act of invention-
conception and reduction to practice, either by actual construc-
tion or operation, or by filing an allowable patent application-is,
in the law of patents, the first and original inventor when the
other inventor, though prior in conception, has failed to exercise
due diligence in reducing his invention to practice, either by actual
construction or use, or by filing an allowable patent application.
And with this corollary added: That it is not incumbent upon
him who thus completes the inventive act first, as a prerequisite to
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his award of priority, to establish the fact of due diligence onl his
part, but he may remain silent and rest the date of his conception
upon the filing date of his patent application.
I have used the term "allowable" as qualifying the patent
application which may constitute constructive reduction to prac-
tice because Judge Colt employs it and because Commissioner
Mitchell so used it in Lorraine v. Thurniond,17 which case Judge
Colt quotes as authority.
And this raises another question. I have before me at this
time a case involving this question wherein the original applica-
tion was distinctly "allowable" as to the subject-matter which it
contained, but which wholly failed to disclose the subject-matter
of the subsequently contested claim and which the applicant must
carry back to his filing date to anticipate the subsequently-filed
application. Does such filing of an "allowable" application carry
the undisclosed subject-matter back to the filing date even if it
be proved by supplemental oath and by affidavits that such undis-
closed subject-matter was, in fact, a part of the original inven-
tion?
Without further suggestion of conditions which this rule
fails to fit, let us turn very briefly to Judge Putham's main reason
for holding Watson rather than Thomas the first inventor. This
may be done by a paraphrase of his statement: "Undoubtedly
the decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
was sound, because the issue there was purely one between two
rival inventors. . But here there arises another consideration,
namely, the right of the public at large, in addition to the respec-
tive rights of the rival inventors. Watson conceived the inven-
tion and disclosed it to others long prior to Thomas. He made a
disclosure which, even if published in a foreign publication, would
have been quite sufficient to constitute a complete anticipation of
Thomas. It was a disclosure amply sufficient to enable another
to construct and use the invention, and was, therefore, as against
Thomas and any other inventor save Watson, an absolute antici-
pation."
It5z 0. G. 1781 (x8go).
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As said at the outset, it would ill become me to attempt an
academic solution of this vexed question. But even from this
much-condensed, and perhaps inadequate, review of the case, we
may draw certain conclusions which may be useful. First, con-
structive reduction to practice by filing an allowable patent appli-
cation has been given a position of importance heretofore unde-
fined, because this exact condition had never before been pre-
sented to the courts. Second, that this ruling is of final control
where it fits the facts; but that there are obviously numerous con-
ditions to which it could rot be applied except by material modifi-
cation. Third, it teaches inventors and-attorneys alike that dili-
gence in reduction to practice, either by actual construction or by
filing an allowable patent application, grows in importance with
the increase of inventive genius and intensity of industrial
struggle.
William Macomber.
Buffalo, N. Y.
